By Mir Lutful Kabir Saadi
Dhaka: Bangladesh’s effort to establish accountability for the violence surrounding the 2024 July-August uprising entered another consequential phase this week when the International Crimes Tribunal-2 sentenced former Awami League General Secretary Obaidul Quader and six other senior political leaders to death for crimes against humanity.
The verdict, delivered on September 15, was the seventh judgment in cases arising from the uprising that culminated in the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government on August 5, 2024. Across those seven cases, 68 people have now been convicted and 22 sentenced to death, according to Bangladeshi reporting. Eighteen of those sentenced to death are reported to be at large, while four are in custody.
Quader, former state minister for information Mohammad Ali Arafat, Awami League Joint General Secretary AFM Bahauddin Nasim, Jubo League leaders Sheikh Fazle Shams Parash and Moinul Hossain Khan Nikhil, and former Chhatra League leaders Saddam Hussain and Sheikh Wali Asif Enan were tried in absentia.
The tribunal convicted them on charges involving murder and other serious abuses, including allegations of incitement, conspiracy, abetment and command or superior responsibility. The prosecution’s case was that senior political figures helped organise, direct or facilitate a coordinated response involving state security forces and party-affiliated groups against the protest movement.
The tribunal also ordered the confiscation of 50 per cent of the movable and immovable property of Quader, Nasim, Arafat, Parash and Nikhil. The judgment directed that the assets be sold and the proceeds used to compensate families of people killed or injured during the uprising through the July Foundation or another statutory institution.
The significance of the case, however, extends well beyond the fate of seven former ruling-party figures. It has become another test of whether Bangladesh can pursue accountability for some of the gravest violence in its recent history while maintaining judicial standards capable of withstanding scrutiny at home and abroad.
An Eight-Month Trial
The proceedings followed a lengthy investigation into the violent suppression of the quota-reform movement that began in July 2024 and rapidly developed into a nationwide uprising. According to The Daily Star, the investigation agency submitted its report to the prosecution on December 7, 2025. The tribunal took cognisance of the case later that month, framed charges on January 22, 2026 and began the trial on February 17. Twenty-nine prosecution witnesses testified, while prosecution and defence closing arguments were completed over nine working days between August 4 and 17.
The three-member tribunal was headed by Justice Nazrul Islam Chowdhury, with Justice Md Manjurul Basit and Justice Nur Mohammad Shahriar Kabir.
The tribunal’s judgment represents a substantial judicial record concerning the alleged political and organisational responsibility for violence during the uprising. But the weight of a judgment is not determined solely by its length or by the seriousness of the allegations. Its lasting credibility will depend on the evidence, the reasoning applied to each accused person and the fairness of the process through which the evidence was tested.
The Case Against Obaidul Quader
Quader, who was Awami League general secretary and a senior cabinet minister during the uprising, occupied a central position in the prosecution case. The prosecution alleged that he encouraged and facilitated attacks on protesters, participated in a conspiracy to suppress the movement, helped coordinate operations involving security forces and party-affiliated groups, and bore superior or command responsibility for crimes allegedly committed during the crackdown.
The tribunal accepted substantial elements of the prosecution’s case and imposed death sentences on Quader on three charges, while sentencing him to imprisonment until death on another.
The prosecution presented evidence concerning alleged communications between Quader and senior leaders of the Bangladesh Chhatra League and other affiliated organisations. It also alleged coordination involving political leaders, party cadres and security agencies.
The defence rejected those allegations. State-appointed defence lawyer M Hasan Imam argued that his clients were not directly involved in the killings and challenged the application of command responsibility. He said the accused had not issued the commands alleged by the prosecution and were not physically present at many of the locations where crimes were committed. He indicated that the defence would need to examine the complete judgment before determining the grounds for appeal.
The legal question is therefore not simply whether violence occurred. It is whether the evidence established, to the required legal standard, the individual responsibility of each accused person for the specific crimes for which he was convicted.
Different Defendants, Different Findings
Although all seven defendants received death sentences, the tribunal did not treat their cases as identical. The judgment made different findings on different charges, with some defendants acquitted of particular allegations and receiving different sentences on other counts. This is important because it indicates that the tribunal considered the charges individually rather than simply imposing a single uniform finding on all seven.
The precise reasoning will become particularly important on appeal, especially concerning the evidentiary basis for attributing individual responsibility to political leaders who were not alleged to have personally carried out every underlying act.
The complete judgment should therefore be examined closely for its treatment of documentary evidence, witness testimony, communications, organisational authority and the legal standards governing superior or command responsibility.
The Scale of the July-August Violence
The trials are taking place against the backdrop of extraordinary violence in July and August 2024. A United Nations human-rights investigation found reasonable grounds to believe that the former government, its security and intelligence apparatus, and violent elements associated with the Awami League were responsible for serious human-rights violations during the crackdown. The UN investigation documented hundreds of extrajudicial killings, widespread injuries, arbitrary arrests and detention, and torture and other ill-treatment.
The UN’s earlier preliminary analysis had already documented violent attacks on protesters, including attacks by members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League at Dhaka University and the killing of student protester Abu Sayed by police in Rangpur on July 16, 2024.
The movement began as a protest against the government’s public-sector quota system but rapidly expanded as clashes intensified between protesters, security forces and government-aligned groups. By early August, the protests had evolved into a broader challenge to Hasina’s government. Her departure on August 5, 2024 brought an end to more than 15 years of Awami League rule.
The subsequent judicial process has therefore acquired two intertwined functions: accountability for alleged crimes and the creation of an authoritative legal record of one of the most consequential episodes in Bangladesh’s recent history. That makes the credibility of the trials especially important.
A Rapidly Expanding Tribunal Record
The Quader judgment significantly expands the tribunal’s record of convictions arising from the July uprising. Seven verdicts have now resulted in convictions of 68 people, with 22 receiving death sentences. Eighteen of those 22 are reported to be fugitives.
The defendants across these cases include former ministers and political leaders as well as senior police officials accused of responsibility for killings and other abuses. Former prime minister Sheikh Hasina and former home minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal were sentenced to death in November 2025 after being convicted in absentia.
The continuing prosecutions therefore represent a major judicial reckoning with the former ruling establishment. But their expanding scale has also intensified international scrutiny of the tribunal itself.
The International-Law Question
The central international concern is not whether serious crimes should be investigated or prosecuted. International human-rights organisations have repeatedly called for accountability for serious violations committed during the 2024 crackdown. The more difficult question is how that accountability is achieved.
Human Rights Watch has raised significant concerns about the tribunal’s procedures, including arrest powers, pretrial detention, the time available to defence teams, trials in absentia and restrictions on cross-examination. It has also questioned the reliability of some witness statements, including cases where passages allegedly appear repeatedly across different statements.
Human Rights Watch’s criticism is also rooted in the tribunal’s earlier history. The organisation has noted that the ICT proceedings conducted during the Awami League period were themselves criticised for serious fair-trial deficiencies. Its position is that Bangladesh should not reproduce those weaknesses while prosecuting members of the former ruling establishment.
Amnesty International has separately opposed the death penalty in the ICT cases, arguing that victims of the 2024 violence deserve accountability through fair and impartial trials rather than capital punishment. These criticisms do not, by themselves, determine whether the seven defendants are guilty or innocent. They concern the integrity of the judicial process through which guilt has been determined. That distinction is essential.
The Awami League Rejects the Verdict
The Awami League, whose political activities are currently banned, has rejected the tribunal’s judgments as politically motivated and challenged their legal legitimacy. The defence has similarly maintained that the accused were not directly responsible for the killings attributed to them and has questioned the basis on which individual responsibility was established.
At the same time, supporters of the July movement have welcomed the convictions as recognition of the suffering endured by protesters and their families. The sharply contrasting reactions illustrate the broader political environment in which the tribunal is operating. For supporters of the uprising, the trials represent an overdue search for accountability. For the former ruling party and its supporters, the proceedings are viewed through the lens of political exclusion and retaliation. A credible judicial process must therefore be capable of addressing both the gravity of the alleged crimes and the rights of those accused. Indeed, the strength of the evidence and the fairness of the process ultimately reinforce rather than undermine each other.
Human Rights Watch has warned that weak investigations and deficient procedures could undermine justice not only for defendants but also for victims and their families. The principle is straightforward: if the evidence against an accused person is compelling, a transparent and rigorous trial strengthens the legitimacy of the conviction. If procedural safeguards are weakened, even a conviction based on substantial evidence can become vulnerable to claims that the outcome was predetermined.
The Road Ahead
The immediate challenge is enforcement. All seven defendants in the Quader case were tried in absentia and are reported to be at large. The authorities therefore face the practical question of securing custody through lawful means, including any applicable extradition or other international mechanisms.
There is also the question of appeals and the procedures governing capital convictions. The tribunal’s judgment is an important stage in the process, but the eventual legal status of the convictions will depend on the applicable appellate and constitutional procedures. The confiscation order adds another dimension. If the assets are recovered and transferred transparently to victims’ families, compensation could provide a tangible expression of accountability rather than leaving justice at the level of courtroom symbolism. More broadly, Bangladesh must determine what institutional legacy the July uprising will leave.
The country has already moved from mass protest to regime change, and from political transition to criminal prosecution. The more difficult task is to establish a durable principle that grave abuses are investigated regardless of who commits them; that victims receive recognition and remedy; and that every accused person receives a genuine opportunity to challenge the evidence.
The Larger Verdict
The September 15 judgment is therefore more than another death sentence in a rapidly expanding series of ICT cases. It is part of a larger struggle over how Bangladesh remembers the July uprising, how it defines accountability and what standards of justice it intends to carry into its post-2024 political order.
For families who lost loved ones, justice cannot be merely symbolic. For those accused, punishment cannot substitute for due process. And for Bangladesh as a state, the credibility of this entire reckoning will ultimately depend on whether accountability is understood not simply as the victory of one political camp over another, but as the establishment of a judicial standard capable of surviving changes of government. That may prove to be the more consequential verdict of all.
