Türkiye, after all, is a major country – a weighty regional power with its own interests and demands. It is perhaps fully aware of what lies ahead for the region in terms of reshuffling equations, roles, and the borders of regional centres of influence. It also understands that Israel will work with determination to reach understandings with the new Syrian administration regarding the occupied Golan Heights and the areas into which Israeli forces entered in southern Syria following the fall of the Assad regime.
However, the Kurdish issue is no less important or impactful for the region’s security and stability than the Palestinian issue. Today, it seems clear that the Kurdish question in both Türkiye and Syria holds top priority within the scope of ongoing efforts to adapt to foreseeable and future changes expected in the region.
Nevertheless, the PKK has its influence, due to many factors: the presence of armed forces under its command, its ties with the international coalition led by the United States in the fight against ISIS in Syria, its control over the autonomous administration in northeastern Syria and its relations with the Iranian regime and Iraqi PMF factions.
It is perhaps appropriate to point out here that the current moves and communications among various international and regional players regarding U.S. efforts to broker a peace agreement or normalisation between Syria and Israel cannot be separated from the efforts of the Turkish government domestically, aiming to reach an agreement with Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, on the party’s future and its mode of action. It is evident that the U.S. side supports this effort and is attempting to address this dossier by splitting it into two.
Regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), American pressure is being exerted on the leadership of Ahmad al-Jarba and the SDF to push them toward a consensus for integrating SDF forces into the Syrian Army, and finding a solution for the autonomous administration areas in northeastern Syria. This is to make them return under the sovereignty of the new Syrian administration, in exchange for guarantees concerning rights, roles, authorities, and the nature of the relationship.
As for the Bahçeli initiative and its “Öcalanian” resonance regarding the dissolution of the PKK and abandoning armed struggle – this remains an internal Turkish matter. It tied to the government’s vision and plans for closing the PKK chapter. However, what is striking here is the absence of a clear vision for resolving the Kurdish issue in Türkiye. One still does not observe signs or indicators of a comprehensive initiative proposed by the Turkish government that would represent a just solution to the Kurdish question in Türkiye – a solution based on the unity of the country and its people. This raises many questions among Kurdish political, social, cultural, and economic players outside the PKK’s orbit.
Still, there does appear to be genuine intent on the part of the Turkish government to finalise the PKK issue and its military wing. At the same time, Abdullah Öcalan and most PKK leaders seem inclined to pursue party dissolution, end the armed struggle, and transition toward political engagement. However, some less influential PKK factions, though fewer in number, oppose this approach, refusing to give up armed activity without a reciprocal arrangement – due to a mix of internal organisational dynamics and external regional commitments, particularly with the Iranian regime, which has long used the PKK and its fronts in both Syria and Iraq to serve its expansionist project in the region.
[by Abdul Basit Saida in Al-Quds Al-Arabi]
