By Iqbal Hussain
A famous Bengali proverb says, “When pushed to a corner, even a cat climbs a tree.” This aptly sums up the plight of RSS supremo Mohan Bhagwat during his recent visit to New York. Placed in an unfamiliar geopolitical environment, his remarks sparked widespread discussion: was this a genuine ideological evolution or merely situational expediency? Now he has returned to India, will he revert to his hardline stance or sustain this new found moderation? Experts suggest he is likely to return to his old stance as breaking free from deep seated organisational ideology remains an uphill task. The shift witnessed in New York was largely driven by immediate circumstances rather than a structural transformation.
Bhagwat’s recent speech in New York has placed the RSS before an uncomfortable question: is the organisation genuinely redefining its approach towards Indian Muslims, or is it merely presenting a softer version of Hindutva to an international audience?
Addressing a gathering in New York, the RSS chief declared that if a Hindu believes that Muslims should have no place in Bharat, “he will not remain Hindu.” He portrayed Hindutva as a philosophy that recognises diversity, emphasises human unity and does not envisage an India without Muslims. He also invoked the civilisational idea of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world as one family).
Taken in isolation, Bhagwat’s words sound remarkably inclusive. They seem to reject religious exclusion and affirm the legitimate place of Muslims in India.
But there is an obvious problem. Why does the language of inclusion sound so different when the RSS speaks to the world than when the politics of Hindutva is experienced in India? This is the contradiction that Bhagwat’s New York speech cannot simply wish away.
The RSS has long insisted that India is a Hindu Rashtra. Bhagwat himself has repeatedly defended this formulation, arguing that ‘Hindu’ is a civilisational and cultural category rather than merely a religious one. The organisation maintains that Hindu Rashtra does not mean a theocratic state or the expulsion of Muslims.
Yet the political history surrounding the Sangh Parivar has repeatedly produced an altogether different impression. For decades, the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the demolition of the Babri Masjid, campaigns around religious conversion, love jihad, questions over citizenship and repeated controversies involving Muslims have made the politics of Hindutva deeply contentious. The RSS rejects the charge that it promotes hatred against minorities, but its critics argue that the ideological ecosystem surrounding it has contributed to a political environment in which Muslims increasingly feel that their citizenship is being questioned.
This is precisely why Bhagwat’s New York declaration deserves to be examined not merely as a speech, but against the record of the movement he leads. The contradiction becomes particularly striking when one considers the political ecosystem of the Sangh Parivar. The RSS is not a conventional political party, but its ideological influence on the BJP is undeniable. Reuters has described the RSS as a powerful Hindu organisation from which the BJP emerged and reported that the organisation has undertaken overseas outreach partly to counter international perceptions of its record concerning minorities.
The question, therefore, is not whether Bhagwat has the right to advocate Hindu-Muslim harmony. He certainly does. The question is whether such harmony is being advocated consistently.
A Softer Message Abroad
Bhagwat’s New York appearance came at a particularly sensitive moment. The RSS is celebrating its centenary, and the organisation is increasingly attempting to explain its philosophy to audiences outside India. The New York programme was presented in the language of universal brotherhood, interfaith dialogue and human unity. That is politically understandable.
The RSS has long faced criticism internationally over its ideology and its relationship with minority politics in India. Reuters recently reported that the organisation has been engaging with groups abroad to counter perceptions of itself as a force associated with attacks on minority communities.
Against that background, Bhagwat’s New York message can reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to reassure an international audience: Hindutva, he suggested, is not anti-Muslim; Hindu nationalism does not require the removal of Muslims; and Indian civilisation is fundamentally pluralistic.
But if that is genuinely the new message of the RSS, it raises another question: Why has this principle not been made equally unequivocal and politically consequential within India?
The Problem of Selective Inclusiveness
The central weakness of Bhagwat’s argument lies in the distinction between tolerance and equality. It is one thing to say that Muslims are allowed to live in India. It is quite another to recognise them as equal and autonomous citizens whose national belonging requires no cultural qualification.
The Constitution of India does not say that Muslims are guests in a Hindu civilisation. It does not say that they must accept the label ‘Hindu’ in a cultural sense. It does not demand that a Muslim demonstrate his or her loyalty by accepting a particular interpretation of Indian history or civilisation.
Citizenship is enough. This is where the RSS conception of Hindu Rashtra creates a philosophical tension with constitutional nationalism. If every Indian is expected to accept a Hindu cultural identity irrespective of personal faith, the question naturally arises: who defines that identity, and what happens to those who do not accept it? Bhagwat’s New York speech does not adequately answer this question.
Indeed, it sometimes appears that the RSS wants to have it both ways: internationally, Hindu nationalism is presented as an inclusive civilisation; domestically, the idea of Hindu Rashtra remains central to its ideological identity. That is the essence of the charge of double-speak.
From Babri Masjid Demolition to the Present
For Muslims, political memory is not an abstract matter. The demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 remains one of the defining moments in post-Independence India’s communal history. The Ram temple movement transformed Hindu nationalism from an ideological project into a mass political force. The eventual construction and consecration of the Ram temple has been celebrated by the Sangh as a civilisational achievement. Yet Bhagwat has also spoken of India’s pluralistic traditions and universal humanity. The juxtaposition is difficult to ignore.
The issue is not whether Hindus have a legitimate right to celebrate their religious heritage. They certainly do. The issue is whether the state and national identity should privilege one community’s religious-civilisational narrative over the equally legitimate historical and emotional claims of another.
A genuinely inclusive nationalism would not require Muslims to reinterpret the loss of the Babri Masjid through someone else’s civilisational framework. Nor would it require Hindus to abandon their faith. It would simply insist that the constitutional identity of India belongs equally to both.
Politics of ‘Same Ancestry’
Bhagwat has often argued that Hindus and Muslims share the same ancestors and cultural roots. On the surface, this sounds conciliatory. But even here there is an underlying asymmetry. Why should a Muslim’s equal citizenship depend upon accepting the proposition that his ancestors were Hindu?
A modern democracy does not confer rights on the basis of ancestry. A Muslim does not become more Indian because someone proves that his ancestors belonged to another religion. Nor does a Christian, Sikh, Buddhist or atheist need to establish cultural proximity to Hinduism to demonstrate patriotism. The Constitution settles the matter: citizenship is not a reward for cultural conformity.
Therefore, the more convincing formulation would be not that Muslims are ‘Hindus by culture’ or descendants of Hindus, but that Muslims are Indians in their own right. That distinction is crucial.
International Image Problem
Bhagwat’s New York speech must also be understood in the context of the controversy surrounding his visit. New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani had criticised the RSS ideology as inconsistent with his vision of a secular and pluralistic India, while other American political and interfaith voices also objected to Bhagwat’s appearance. Reuters reported that critics raised concerns over the RSS’s history and allegations of intolerance towards minorities, while the RSS and the Indian government have rejected such accusations. In such an atmosphere, an explicitly conciliatory speech was politically significant. But it also created an unintended test for Bhagwat.
If Muslims are genuinely an inseparable part of Bharat, as he now says, then that principle cannot be merely a message for New York. It must become a principle for Nagpur, Delhi, Ayodhya, Lucknow, Ahmedabad, Kolkata and every other part of India. Words made in America must survive the test of Indian reality.
The Real Measure of Change
There is nothing wrong with Bhagwat changing his language. Political and social organisations are allowed to evolve. Indeed, if the RSS is genuinely moving towards a more inclusive understanding of nationalism, that should be welcomed.
But genuine transformation requires three things: consistency, accountability and institutional consequences. If Bhagwat believes that no Hindu can regard India as a country without Muslims, the Sangh should unequivocally reject every form of anti-Muslim hate speech, regardless of who makes it. If Hindutva is genuinely about human unity, then Muslims should not merely be accepted; they should enjoy unquestioned equality. If Hindu Rashtra does not mean religious domination, the RSS should explain clearly how its conception differs from constitutional secular nationalism. And if Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam truly represents the Sangh’s philosophy, the principle must begin with India’s own minorities.
Beyond the Rhetoric
The problem with Bhagwat’s New York speech is therefore not that it was too inclusive. The problem is that it was not inclusive enough to erase the contradictions between rhetoric and political reality. For years, the RSS has spoken of cultural nationalism, Hindu Rashtra and a shared civilisational identity. Now, before an international audience, its chief is emphasising Muslims’ rightful place in India and declaring that exclusion of Muslims is contrary to genuine Hindutva. That is a striking shift in tone. But tone is not transformation. The real test will come when the same message is delivered with equal force when there is no foreign audience, no international scrutiny and no reputational cost.
If Bhagwat genuinely believes that an India without Muslims is incompatible with Hindu thought, he has an opportunity to make that proposition the new moral centre of the Sangh’s public life. Until then, critics will continue to see the New York speech as a carefully calibrated exercise in image management, a softer face presented abroad while the ideological architecture at home remains substantially unchanged.
India, however, needs more than a softer face. It needs a nationalism in which a Muslim does not have to prove that he belongs, a Hindu does not have to fear losing his identity, and citizenship is not measured by proximity to any particular religion or civilisation.
If Bhagwat’s New York message is sincere, the next chapter of the RSS should not merely be about changing its language abroad. It should be about changing the political meaning of that language at home. Until that happens, the gap between what Bhagwat says in New York and what the Sangh’s ideology and political ecosystem have represented in India will remain one of the most important contradictions in contemporary Indian politics.
[The writer is a freelance journalist, columnist writer and translator based in Kolkata.]
